THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GAMBIAN RANGELAND AND WATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: LESSONS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA by Akinboade, O.A.




THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GAMBIAN 
RANGELAND AND WATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  : 






This article examines the conception, design, implementation and monitoring of The Gambian 
rangeland and water development project based in Niamina Dankunku and Niamina West 
districts of the country. It attempts to make a management evaluation of the project, gaining an 
insight into the nature of the development problem and the approach adopted by the project for 
its solution. It then seeks to examine the lessons that southern African countries could learn 
from this experience in the light of similarities in socio-economic circumstances. The conception 
of the project was sound in so far as it attempted to tackle the problem of environmental 
degradation by a system of controlled management of scarce range resources. However, the 
question of increasing cattle off-take which could have also reduced grazing pressure on range 
resources was not addressed. The project's initial focus on the relatively well off category of 
cattle owners was corrected by incorporating a food-aid component to address project's concern 
for the poorer segment of the society. While it was a good idea, the use of food-aid took away the 
expected financial contribution of the local community to project management and financed a 
significant part of project activities. The paper welcomes the conception of the income 
generation components but finds their introduction rather arbitrary. The project's flexibility 
and its approach of participatory management are recognised as its main strength, which could 
assure sustainability of project achievements. In addition, the project is a good example of 
strong co-operative involvement of a number of development agencies in jointly solving the 
development problem and co-ordinating development assistance. 
 
DIE IMPLEMENTERING VAN DIE GAMBIESE WEILAND- EN 
WATERONTWIKKELINGSPROJEK : LESSE VIR SUIDER-AFRIKA 
 
Hierdie artikel ondersoek die konsepsie, ontwerp, implementering en monitering van die 
Gambiese weiland- en waterontwikkelingsprojek in die Niamina Dankunku en Niamina-Wes 
distrikte van die land.  Daar word gepoog om ‘n bestuursevaluering van die projek te doen en 
sodoende insig te bekom in die aard van die ontwikkelingsprobleem en die benadering deur die 
projek aanvaar vir die oplos daarvan.  Dit poog dan om die lesse wat Suider-Afrikaanse lande 
uit die ervaring kan leer te ondersoek in die lig van soortgelykhede in sosio-ekonomiese 
toestande.  Die konsepsie van die projek was gesond in die sin dat dit gepoog het om die 
probleem van omgewingsageruitgang deur ‘n sisteem van beheerde bestuur van skaars 
weibronne aan te pak.  Die moontlikheid vir toenemende beesomset wat ook kon help om 
weidingsdruk op weidingsbronne te verlig, is egter nie aangespreek nie.  Die inisiële fokus op 
die relatief welaf kategorie beeseienaars is reggestel deur die inkorporasie van ‘n 
                     




voedselhulpkomponent om die projek se betrokkenheid by die armer deel van die bevolking aan 
te spreek.   
 
Hoewel dit ‘n goeie idee was het die gebruik van voedselhulp die verwagte finansiële bydrae van 
die plaaslike gemeenskap tot die projekbestuur laat wegval.  Die artikel verwelkom die konsepsie 
van die inkomste-genererende komponente, maar bevind dat hul invoering taamlik arbitrêr was. 
 Die plooibaarheid en benadering van deelnemende bestuur in die projek was die sterkste punt 
wat die volhoubaarheid van projekprestasie kon verseker.  Hierbenewens is die projek ‘n goeie 
voorbeeld van ‘n sterk samewerkende betrokkenheid van ‘n aantal ontwikkelingsagentskappe om 
die ontwikkelingsproblematiek gesamentlik op te los en ontwikkelingshulp te koördineer.   
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The tragedy of the commons dominates the literature in explaining livestock 
problems in Africa. Though there are controversies about its ability to fully 
explain livestock development problems especially in the developing world, a 
number of livestock development projects have been based on this hypothesis. 
These include a number of projects in Kenya (Davis, 1971 and Oxby, 1981); 
other East African countries (Bennett, 1984); some West African countries 
(Riddell, 1982); Botswana (Lawry, 1983). Botswana introduced the Tribal 
Grazing Land Policy in 1975 (Republic of Botswana, 1985) to deal with the same 
problem of overgrazing and overstocking in communal areas. As a result, tribal 
land was leased to large cattle owners who were given exclusive rights on the 
communal land to own ranches. These projects have sought to change 
communally held land to those held by private individuals or some defined 
groups. They have been characterised by pervading sense of failure (Vink & 
Kassier, 1987). It is against this history of widespread failure that this paper 
discusses the case of GAM/86/006, a Gambian rangeland development project 
considered by many as being successful. 
 
Livestock production in The Gambia, like the rest of agriculture, is still largely 
traditional, exhibiting limited evidence of commercialisation as livestock is kept 
mainly as a store of wealth and for other socio-cultural reasons. The age-old 
system of transhumance is adopted, with low productivity, permitting a slow 
but occasional gradual increases in livestock numbers insufficient to catch up 
with the human population growth rate of about 3,4 percent per annum. High 
population growth rate combines with endemic poverty resulting in 
uncontrolled consumption of natural capital. 
 
The rangelands in The Gambia are communally owned. There is no evidence of 
strict enforcement of their use as individual livestock owners adopt own 
grazing practices with little adoption of controlled systematic grazing strategy 




fires initiated by the traditional practice of slash and burn cropping technique 
and that of game hunting through bush burning. The problem of the commons 
is not just one of overstocking. Lyne & Nieuwoudt (1990) suggest that in the 
absence of property rights to grazing land, stockowners also lack the incentive 
to upgrade pastures and herd quality. In a Sahelian country that experiences 
significant fluctuations in rainfall and suffers from recurrent drought, the lack 
of adequate watering facility for livestock could pose a major obstacle to 
economic optimisation. River water is unsuitable for livestock consumption in 
some parts of the country and of the project districts because of high salinity. In 
The Gambia, the processing of livestock products is highly under-developed, 
employing simple rudimentary techniques. So is the processing of other 
products. 
 
It has been estimated that there were between 30 000 and 40 000 heads of cattle 
in The Gambia in the 1930s (The Gambia, 1992a). It is also reported that this 
rose to 340 433 heads in 1991. McCarthy Island Division is the leading region of 
the country in terms of livestock production. In 1990, Cattle Population in this 
Division was estimated to be 123 764. The districts of Dankunku and Niamina 
West where GAM/86/006 was located accounted for a substantial proportion 
of this number. A baseline survey (The Gambia, 1992a and Senesi, 1990) 
estimated that there were 9  499 heads of cattle in the Districts of Niamina 
Dankunku and Niamina West in 1987 increasing to 11 228 in 1991. 
 
Confronted with communal grazing land with open access, the government of 
the Gambia could address the problem of overstocking by adopting some of the 
following options suggested in the literature:  
 
(1)  land privatisation,  
(2)  introducing cattle taxes and  
(3)  introducing quota restrictions on the number of cattle permitted on the 
common.  
 
Runge (1981) contended that under conditions of open access and strict 
individual dominance, privatisation of grazing land is the only stable solution 
to overstocking. The need to increase off-take rate and stabilise cattle 
population were emphasised in both the first and the second five-year 
development plans of The Gambia (1975/76 - 1979/80 & 1981/82 - 1985/86). 
The Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) implemented later (1985-1990) 
emphasised the promotion of private sector participation in the productive 
sectors of the economy including livestock especially by breaking the external 
marketing monopoly of the state-owned Livestock Marketing Board (LMB). 




first two options proved unacceptable to policy makers. Their introduction, it 
was feared might lead the electorates to switch political alliances away from the 
ruling party. The third option based on moral suasion guided the formulation 
of GAM/86/006. Orthodox solutions are usually considered unacceptable to 
policy makers. As a further example, a 1967 stock limitation legislation 
introduced in KwaZulu Natal, RSA was discontinued in 1988, and the attempt 
to introduce a cattle tax in the area was rejected (Lyne & Nieuwoudt, 1990). 
 
The first section of the paper reviews the background to the project 
GAM/86/006. The objectives and achievements of the project are discussed 
with the participatory style of project management in the second section. The 
main income generation components are detailed in section three. The last 
section discusses come vital lessons to be learned from the experience of 
GAM/86/006 by southern African countries where rangelands are also fast 
disappearing (Darkoh, 1996). 
 
1.2  Cattle population in the project area 
 
Table 1:  Cattle population by composition 
 
  Niamina Dankunku District  Niamina West District 
 1987  1991  %  change  1987 1991  %  change 
Bulls    880    916   4,1    773    864  11,8 
Cows  2 316  2 504   8,1  2 977  3 193   7,3 
Weaners    418    462  10,5    395    440  11,3 
Sucklings    641    720  12,3    691    836  20,9  
Oxen    178    186   4,5    230    243   5,7 
TOTAL  4 433  4 788   8,0  5 066  6 440  27,1 
 
Source:  The Gambia, 1992a 
 
1.3  GAM/86/006 - the rangeland and water development project  
 
At the time of conception of GAM/86/006, there was only one 
borehole/watering point in Dankunku and Niamina West Districts providing 
an inadequate amount of drinking water for the Districts' herd requirement. 
The rangeland around the watering point was badly degraded, bush fires were 
also an annual occurrence, the health of the animals and hence of human 
population inhabiting the Districts was also poor. As a result, GAM/86/006 
was formulated with the objective of preventing desertification and 




pasture feed supply in abundant quantities, around the boreholes and livestock 
watering points, in the districts of Niamina Dankunku and Niamina West, an 
area of 27,000 hectares, covering 54 villages. 
 
There were two aspects to the project: the first concerning institutional building 
in the Ministry of Agriculture through the establishment of a rangeland and 
forage production Division within the Department of Livestock Services. The 
second component was that of project implementation which sought to use 
GAM/86/006 as a model for replication in The Gambia and elsewhere. 
 
The activities of GAM/86/006 followed up on a previous project 
UNSO/GAM/82/X03 entitled "Rangelands Development and protection of 
land around livestock watering points". Funded by the United Nations Sudano-
Sahelian Office and executed by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), it constructed 28 boreholes and water points, purchased associated 
equipment at a total project cost of US$ 229,772. Its activities covered a greater 
number of districts in the McCarthy Island Division than those of 
GAM/86/006. 
 
2.  PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
The following is a discussion of the project’s objectives and its achievements. 
 
1.  A fully staffed and functional Range and Forage Production Division was 
established in the Department of Livestock Services headed by a 
University graduate working with some assistants. Four extension staff 
were sponsored for overseas training in Animal Husbandry, 
conservation and treatment of crop residues, forage production and 
utilisation and small scale milk processing. 
 
2.  The Livestock Owners Association in the project area was re-organised 
and strengthened to form the local project management committee which 
facilitated local people’s participation in the project and centralised 
management of project facilities and rangeland. The project also 
organised a number of seminars and workshops to train local herdsmen 
in livestock management 
 
3.  It was planned to establish three blocks of degraded rangeland, about 
1 000 hectares each in size, for fencing and rehabilitation. In the end, the 
project protected 3200 hectares of degraded rangeland in two blocks of 
2050 and 1150 hectares each. These were used to demonstrate the 




seeding, conservation and deferred grazing. The blocks were managed in 
a system of rotational grazing allowing for pastoral regeneration during 
the dry season and preventing excessive grazing during the rains. The 
project also encouraged villagers' own-initiatives to conserve crop 
residues for utilisation as complementary dry season feeding and to 
assure greater community participation in project management. This 
resulted in significant reduction in feed deficit. 
 
4.  Three watering points of 16 hectares each were fenced and equipped 
with water tanks and drinking troughs as well as undergoing the process 
of afforestation. One borehole was re-habilitated and another constructed 
to improve water availability necessary to encourage rotational livestock 
grazing. Sixteen cattle access bridges were constructed in the process, 
linking grazing areas with the swamps, thereby increasing dry season 
livestock drinking sources. The Livestock Owners Association was to 
contribute towards maintaining the running costs of the facilities. 
 
5.  In order to prevent accidental bush fires, it was planned to establish 42 
kilometres of firebreaks (though only 29 were completed) around the 
rangeland re-habilitation sites and watering points. The fire-breaks were 
established using imported machinery initially, followed by a 
progressive handing over of their maintenance to the villagers who were 
encouraged to cultivate and crop the breaks using traditional methods 
for ease of application, project acceptability and sustainability. The 
villagers were sensitised to the deleterious effects of bush/grass fires and 
encouraged to set up organisational structures to prevent fires during the 
dry seasons. To assure the immediate detection of bush fire, a 
watchtower was constructed in Dankunku. 
 
6.  The project maintained the three already established pasture and seed 
multiplication sites in Yundum, Yorro Beri Kunda and Giroba Kunda for 
future pasture seed multiplication. In addition, new seed multiplication 
sites were established in Dankunku and the afforestation areas were 
supposed to be interplanted with native grass Andropogon gayanus. Re-
seeding activities were carried out on annual basis during the rainy 
season consistent with recommended procedures. 
 
7.  An integrated rangeland, water and livestock development scheme was 
hence instituted which would serve as a model for other districts. 
 
8.  As the project implementation progressed, it became clear to project 




Livestock Owners Association might be a strong obstacle to participatory 
involvement in project implementation and may have serious 
repercussion for project success and sustainability. A decision was hence 
taken in 1987 to amend the project document slightly by incorporating 
potential income generation components. A Dairy Plant fully equipped 
with pasteurising equipment, batch pasteuriser boiler and cooling system 
using solar facilities, basic milk collection facilities, manual 
standardisation, butter making and quality testing facilities was 
established to process raw milk into Yoghurt, Ghee and Cheese. The Unit 
became fully operational in March 1991. A Rest House was also 
constructed in Dankunku as the second income generation component. 
 
9.  The project's success contributed towards an 18 percent increase in cattle 
population in the two districts between 1987 and 1991 as shown in Table 
1. This may be partly due to the success achieved in protecting the 
rangeland and assuring all year round water supply encouraging in-
migration of cattle from adjacent districts as well as encouraging the 
purchase of additional heads of cattle by new or current owners. 
 
10.  Finally, the project took into consideration the health and nutrition of the 
population living around the project site as a result of which it provided 
clean safe piped-borne water for human consumption at Dankunku 
veterinary station. This served to prevent the occurrence of water borne 
diseases in the project districts 
 
2.1  Project management style 
 
The project was nationally executed and implemented contrary to the 
prevailing norm in the UN system at the time. The implementing agency 
undertook traditional roles including preparing and submitting annual 
workplans, budgets and requisitions quarterly and other financial reports. It 
also executed the workplans. National execution was favoured for its 
advantage in imparting a sense of national belonging to an otherwise Donor 
funded project. In addition, if successfully implemented, the project could 
augment national human resource capacity or build one where none previously 
existed. GAM/86/006 was executed by the Ministry of Agriculture, co-
ordinated by the Permanent Secretary. The government provided the national 
professional project support staff through the Department of Livestock services 
whose Director served as National Project Director. He was assisted by an 
internationally recruited technical adviser with specialisation in rangeland 
development. In addition, a United Nations Volunteer (UNV) specialist in 




aspects of project implementation. Later, a UNV Dairy technologist was also 
recruited. It was initially envisioned to employ the services of an Associate 
Expert in water engineering to liaise with the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment and assist in overseeing the take-off of the water 
development aspect of the project. On the basis of unsuccessful preliminary 
contacts with Donors, this idea was shelved and not reactivated through out the 
project life. 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture was to establish close co-operation with the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment for the smooth execution of the 
natural resources component of the project. A programme steering committee 
was to be instituted comprising all Heads of Department of the Ministries of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources and Environment. The project co-operated 
with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
which provided a rangeland management expert and backstopped all technical 
assistance personnel. The World Food Programme (WFP) provided food for 
work in all project activities. Co-operation was to be maintained with the 
Department of Water Resources for drilling boreholes, the Department of 
Forestry, local NGOs and the local community. 
 
The initial funding by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
was US $200,000, government inputs in kind 143,000 Dalasis and Livestock 
Owners Association (LOA) inputs in kind 87,320 Dalasis. Over a period of six 
years the original UNDP input was increased to US $1,180,769. The project was 
expected to have a 14-month duration, terminating in 1988. This duration was 
rather short, overly optimistic and might have been dictated largely by 
considerations of the financial limitations of the funding agency. The duration 
was extended to 1989 and again to 1990; but a tripartite review meeting in 
December 1990 recommended that in view of the substantial progress made, 
the project be extended for a further period of one (1) year to consolidate 
activities. During the consolidation phase new components, viz. a rest house at 
Dankunku, solar electricity supply, tsetse monitoring and control, and water 
supply for human consumption were incorporated in the project activities. 1992 
saw the process of progressive withdrawal of technical assistance to the local 
community in order to allow for necessary adjustment to post-project lack of 
technical support. 
 
2.2  Participatory project management 
 
Popular participation in development projects is widely advocated by 
international development agencies (UN 1975; 1976;1981). They emphasise the 




consultation and the expression of popular opinion. And as Nkunika (1987) 
pointed out, the participation of local people in development programmes is 
very crucial in ensuring successful implementation. He cites the example of  the 
gravity-fed rural piped water supply project introduced to the Chingale area, 
south of Malawi in 1969. Though water was a critical problem in the area, it was 
found that mere introduction of the technology was not going to assure success 
unless it was preceded by a series of consultations between project officers and 
the local people. The project was implemented on the basis of frequent 
consultation with local people, and the formation of a number of committees 
that were involved in project activities. 
 
GAM/86/006 assisted in organising a local project management committee, 11 
men and 4 women, comprising of livestock owners and herders within the 
project districts. This committee became the focal point for local level project 
decision making, and later managed such project facilities as concerned with 
watering, fire control, the rehabilitation and maintenance of reserve pastures. 
Their progressive involvement in own-resource management was positive and 
served to bring a grassroots approach to project management.  To assist the 
working of the committee, the project provided a multi-purpose building to 
serve as the forum for frank discussion and an exchange of ideas. 
 
The inclusion of women in the committee stems from the broader focus given to 
the project around 1988 to consider the whole community as the project target 
group. The inclusion of women into the committee, although gave the project 
some functional flexibility also introduced an element of internal conceptual 
contradiction. Initially, the essential focus was on promoting range protection 
and rehabilitation. It was hence originally designed to benefit cattle owners 
who constitute the richer section of the population at the exclusion of most of 
the poorer small stock owning population, largely female farmers. In the project 
area, the few women that own cattle usually leave such under the management 
of male members of the family or a herdsman. This oversight in the choice of 
target group was rectified by the inclusion of WFP assistance and the 
conception of the income generation components. 
 
It is however to be said that the inclusion of women in the Committee did not 
improve women's involvement in project management. A great number of 
women in the districts only knew of the income generation components 
particularly the Milk Processing Unit which is seen as an important source of 
financial empowerment as opposed to the range management component with 
which they are less identified occupationally. Women were hence only 
marginally involved in project activities as well as in decision making. 




3.  THE DANKUNKU DAIRY PLANT OR MILK PROCESSING UNIT  
 
The Project's Technical Adviser observed in 1988 that cattle in the project area 
was producing a substantial quantity of fresh milk estimated at 1000 litres per 
day. He requested the conduct of a feasibility study under FAO supervision of 
milk processing in the project area. On the basis of a consultancy fielded, it was 
estimated that between 500 and 600 litres of milk per day would be available for 
processing all the year round for marketing within the vicinity of project site 
(Duchatel, 1989). 
 
A UNV Dairy Technologist was subsequently recruited to design and 
implement a village milk processing Plant based on the continuous application 
of simple easily transferable technology. As a result, the Dankunku Dairy Plant 
was constructed (13m by 9m) with a side boiler room (4m by 3m) and equipped 
with locally manufactured boiler and batch pasteuriser, solar powered 
refrigeration system, basic milk collection equipment, manual standardisation, 
quality control and butter making implements. It started operation in March 
1991, commercial operation in August and attracted a lot of socio-political 
visibility that His Excellency, the former President Sir Dawda Jawara presided 
over the ceremony to declare it open in September 1991. After a year of 
operation, March 1991 - March 1992, it was reported that a total of 9000 litres of 
fresh milk were processed (UNDP, 1992a). This is equivalent to a daily 
processing of less than 30 litres of fresh milk falling far too short of the level 
estimated in the feasibility study. 
 
The Plant's main product is yoghurt which is sold in the vicinity of the project at 
the price of US $0.4 and in Banjul (about 300 km away) at an attractive price of 
US $0.6. Sales in the local market accounted for about 25 percent of the total 
made directly from site of the Plant in Dankunku whereas the sale in Greater 
Banjul is made to the United Nations Missions, Agencies for International 
Development, Government Institutions and to the Supermarkets. The project 
reported a profit of D14,122 (US $2,017 at US$ = D7). An evaluation report 
(UNDP, 1992) shows that this profit is not real and has come about at an 
unprecedented level of Government, Donor and private subsidy. It is sufficient 
to note that the activities of the Dairy Plant accounted for an increased 
proportion of direct project cost in 1990 and thereafter. The milk Plant hence 
became the project's most critical component and acquired the status of the 
potential guarantor of project's sustainability. 
 
The establishment of the Dairy Plant had a hidden objective of initiating and 
promoting the cautious introduction of livestock commercialisation around the 




keepers to operate and maintain project outputs and thereby ensuring post-
project sustainability. As said earlier, other measures like instituting land 
reform, which could have, given rise to a land market to achieve agricultural 
commercialisation were not adopted. 
 
An understanding was signed in 1991 with the United Nations World Food 
Programme (WFP) by the project staff and Management Committee to institute 
a profit sharing scheme whereby; 30 percent of the profit is given as bonus to 
milk producers, 45 percent would be kept as reserve fund, 15 percent would be 
allocated to the maintenance of range infrastructures, 5 percent for 
miscellaneous expenditures related to the operation of the Dairy Plant, 3 
percent would be kept for distribution as prizes to the best milk producers, 2 
percent of the profit was to be given to the project staff to complement 
remunerations given in kind. 
 
The modality for arriving at the profit sharing scheme is rather arbitrary. It 
however shows the importance attached to the operation of the Dairy Plant 
which hitherto is the only income generating component of the project. It was 
argued that the system of bonus distribution would instil a sense of project 
belonging to beneficiaries and serve to encourage others to be associated with 
the project. 
 
3.1  The rest-house  
 
This is the project’s second income generation component. Information 
concerning its conception and operational activities are not well documented. 
The idea behind the construction of the Rest House stems from the perceived 
need to locate on-site project officials to enable them take daily responsibility 
for its management. Although, this idea was never realised, largely due to the 
reluctance of officials to live in a rural setting lacking the most basic of modern 
amenities, the construction of the Rest House progressed notwithstanding. 
 
The Rest House was equipped with solar refrigerator and lighting equipment 
and was also designed to be equipped with solar fans. It was completed and 
became fully operational in November 1991 with UNDP's financial contribution 
of US $8,000 covering the cost of procuring associated equipment. Labour was 
contributed by the local community and paid for in kind with WFP food ration.  
 
The construction of the Rest House was highly unconventional and as a result 
no proper architectural Plan was followed. The design of the House followed 
the dictates of semi-informed local officials though the procurement of 




was that the Rest House was constructed against the direction of the wind. In a 
tropical environment, this has meant that the interior of the house could be 
extremely hot and humid. The project also experienced difficulty procuring the 
aforementioned solar fans further compounding the problems of staying in the 
Rest House and limiting its comparative advantage over other neighbouring 
Guest Houses. It later served as temporary accommodation for tourists, 
international personnel and Gambian nationals at a fee of approximately US 
$6.00 for non-Gambian and US $1.5 for Gambian nationals. 
 
Provisional estimates showed that the Rest House was a profitable venture 
though the magnitude of possible profit to be generated would be insufficient 
to assure the sustainability of other components of the project (UNDP, 1992a). 
The largest single operating expense was incurred paying the salary of the 
general service staff, a lady who handled its day-to-day maintenance. The initial 
management condition of the Rest House was unfortunately very poor and it 
was not very clear what justified the continued retention of the above-
mentioned staff other than family connection with the traditional Chief of 
Dankunku. The total receipts also seem to be rather low or at best under-
reported for various reasons. It was very easy to observe that the management 
of the Rest House saw the operation as a means of augmenting personal income 
especially at a time when the country was undergoing profound macro-
economic adjustment. Attempts to improve project's financial management was 
at best resisted or ignored and the little that was done was ad hoc, designed to 
satisfy Donor insistence. 
 
3.2  Lessons to be learned from GAM/006 
 
It is important at this stage to assess whether there are any lessons to be learned 
from the conception, formulation and implementation of The Gambian 
Rangeland and Water Development Project. There is no doubt that the 
development problems are complex with no quick-fix solutions. It is also 
evident that there are climatic, economic and farming systems similarities 
between The Gambia and many nations in the southern Africa region. In 
addition, there are important cultural similarities between these countries in 
their approach to the implementation of development assistance. It is therefore 
useful to examine what lessons other nations could learn from the way and 
manner this project has been implemented. 
 
1.  There are major flaws in the design of the project. These relate to the 
wrong selection of target groups and inadequate provision for 
monitoring. It has been mentioned that the initial project conception was 




the most needy part of the population. This is rather inconsistent with 
UNDP's Poverty Alleviation mandate even though the attempt to protect 
the rangeland is consistent with its concern for natural resources and the 
environment. The inadequate provision for monitoring is attributable to 
the insufficiency of funds for project backstopping (FAO, 1993) leading to 
the undertaking of an underfunded analysis of the feasibility of the 
project's major component i.e. the Dairy Plant.  
 
  The 14-month duration specified for the project proved to be too short. 
The various outputs and associated activities of the project are ones that 
cannot be implemented over a short duration especially those involving 
the procurement of equipment from overseas, installation of such 
equipment and the development of local rural capacity to handle them 
on a sustainable basis in a post-project situation. It must also the realised 
that institution building endeavours take time to accomplish and to 
successfully organise the livestock owners into a functional local 
management committee is not an undertaking that can be achieved in a 
matter of days. As a result, the project saw progressive extension on 
annual basis to permit the accomplishment of vital aspects of project 
objectives. Unfortunately, these extensions were rather ad hoc and short-
term in nature, imposing severe restrictions on project workplans, which 
were also short-term in nature and less visionary. This also meant that 
the project could not benefit from long-term planning of project activities 
with the result that some of the activities were hurriedly undertaken and 
others abandoned due to the uncertainties surrounding project future. 
 
2.  The project has been implemented with substantial donor assistance. It 
became highly popular in the country and overseas because of its income 
generation components. As a heavily subsidised intervention, it will be 
very difficult to implement a non-subsidised intervention of a similar 
nature in these or adjacent districts. This has the potential of creating or 
reinforcing a culture of donor dependency in an area of activity where 
the minimal donor intervention would have otherwise been needed.  
 
3.  Participatory local involvement in project management was useful in 
imparting a sense of local project belonging and could guarantee 
sustained local involvement in post-project activities. It is however 
important to assure a democratic local management committee with 
broad representation that does not exclude any section of the society. 
 
4.  Involvement of the World Food Programme. There are disagreements on 




participation of the World Food Programme. The 1992 in-depth 
evaluation of the project reports that the food for work support to the 
project had been commendable, particularly as it acted as an 
additionality in mobilising farmers' participation. The mission did not see 
any negative impact of food for work on farmers' attitude to volunteer to 
work or changes in their consumption habits; neither was there any 
indication that food for work had any negative effects on food 
production in the area. The report of the evaluation however argues that 
the incentive to work might have been greater if the food component had 
been monetised and the remuneration had been given in cash rather than 
in kind.  
 
  On the other hand, the FAO (1993) acknowledged that food-aid played a 
significant role in supporting the activities initiated by the project but 
faulted the evaluation mission in not quantifying the outputs directly 
attributable to the use of food-aid. In addition, the report's assessment of 
the dependency and dis-incentive effects of food-aid provided to the 
project is somewhat contradictory. The FAO argued that the WFP's food 
assistance inadvertently transferred the responsibility of the local 
herdsmen/cattle owners to finance the labour requirement of project 
activities to WFP. The importance of local community contribution had 
been underscored in the project document as having the potential of 
generating local appreciation of important infrastructural developments 
and is a way of assuring post-project sustainability. Since the 
responsibility was transferred to WFP and relied heavily on food 
assistance for their realisation e.g. the maintenance of fencing, 
construction of fire breaks etc., the sustainability of these labour 
demanding tasks is open to question once food assistance is terminated 
unless the communities perceive sufficient benefits to themselves from 
these activities.  
 
5.  The promotion of inter-agency co-operation/co-ordination in project 
implementation. The project was successful in getting a significant 
number of United Nations Agencies to be involved in its implementation. 
The FAO provided technical support and professional backstopping of 
personnel and consultant, the WFP provided food-aid to support project 
activities whereas the United Nations Volunteer Agency was responsible 
for providing the services of the UNV Agricultural Economist and the 
UNV Dairy Technologist. The overall funding was provided by the 
United Nations Development Programme. The project therefore 
provided a unique opportunity for development partners to be jointly 




assisted in promoting the long demanded co-ordination of Donors 
development efforts. The employment of United Nations Volunteers was 
particularly advantageous due to its cost-effective nature. UNVs are very 
highly competent individuals whose commitment to development 
principles are manifested in their spirit of discharging development 
assistance purely on a voluntary basis and at low cost. 
 
6.  Income Generation Components. The realisation of the possible negative 
effect of poverty on local participation in project management and 
sustainability was central to the introduction of the income generation 
components. The idea was nouvelle and visionary. However, no adequate 
feasibility study was carried out of various options of income generation 
activities before deciding on the most suitable for the districts. Hence, the 
choice of the milk processing unit and the construction of the Rest-House 
were rather arbitrary and motivated largely by non-economic 
considerations. Little wonder that the 1992 evaluation mission found the 
Milk Processing Unit an investment failure and unsustainable as an 
economic operation. It is however questionable whether the evaluation of 
an operation established on considerations of non-economic nature 
should have been undertaken using standard economic tools more 
especially as the evaluation report completely ignored the potential of the 
Milk Processing Unit to engineer social cohesion and a sense of social 
identity. It is however important to mention that overall, the contribution 
of the project to promoting social unity is nearly always invisible and is 
apt to be forgotten especially in a community where a substantial 
number of less well-off people perceive 'large' sums of money emanating 
from the income generating components changing only in the hands of 
the very important few to the exclusion of a large majority.  
 
7.  National Project Execution. It has been discussed earlier that the concept 
of national project execution has its advantages especially where the 
capacity exists for such project execution modality. In the case of 
GAM/86/006, a close scrutiny of the composition of the project 
management team and their assigned responsibilities will reveal that the 
project has only been superficially nationally executed. The 
implementation of the range component has been essentially an FAO 
activity realised through the services of the range management expert 
and the United Nations Volunteer(UNV) Agricultural Economist. The 
Milk Processing Unit was also established with the skills of the UNV 
Dairy Technologist and some backstopping by the FAO. The same can be 
said of the construction of the Rest-House. Overall, the extent of skilled 




has been acutely weak and it is very unclear whether sufficient national 
capacity has been built to implement post-project follow-up action. 
 
  The absence of skilled national expertise in vital project components will 
also call to question the wisdom of designating the project for national 
execution and will convey the impression that if any experience has been 
gained by the nationals in the implementation of the project, it is only in 
knowing the means of procuring equipment, making periodic reports 
and in being associated with project implementation. This is all the more 
so when one realises that the workplan for the first three years of the 
project was prepared by the range management expert (supposedly in 
close consultation with the National Director) and the periodic reports 
prepared by the project have been made with minimal national 
involvement. 
 
  The aspect of financial reporting of the project was weak. As a result, the 
1988, 1991 and 1992 Audit reports of the project were consistent in 
pointing to anomalies in financial management. Large purchases of 
relevant items were made in cash without the authority of the local 
purchase order nor the consent of the project Director, and the project has 
been consistent in not maintaining financial records of cash receipts and 
disbursements. The 1992 Audit Report also found difficulty in 
ascertaining the total expenditure on the Rest-House since 1991. 
 
  Some of the problems encountered by the project were also due in part to 
the manner of its execution. The fact of a major change made to the 
project objectives to expand the target group to cover the whole 
community was not properly documented and is difficult to justify 
within the same project. It is however consistent with perceived pattern 
of national project execution in which officials normally prefer that all 
immediate development problems should be solved once and for all 
within the same project. 
 
  It is also important to stress that there can be real difficulties getting 
national institutions to work together to solve common development 
problems without joint control of the project and especially that of the 
budget. The close co-operation which GAM/86/006 was supposed to 
establish with the sister Ministry of Natural Resources and the 
Environment and its respective departments was never fully realised. 
This line Ministry objected to being used just as input supply agency 
without being involved in the decision-making aspect of the project. No 




in fact perceived a misplaced institutional arrangement of the project in 
that the protection of degraded rangeland and the provision of water for 
livestock ought to have been the responsibilities of its Departments of 
Forestry and Water Resources respectively as these functions fall within 
their assigned mandates. The result of the lack of collaboration with the 
relevant Ministry was that the required technical skills for certain 
activities of the project could not be tapped from sister national 
institutions. One of the two Dams was hence constructed on an 
unsuitable site with the wrong soil type and has become an embarrassing 
failure. In addition, an element of institutional jealousy was developed as 
the Department of forestry made every attempt to discredit the project's 
strategy of campaign against bush fires and has been unappreciative of 
its success preferring to ascribe success in combatting incidence of bush 
fires around the project site to its own nationwide campaign which was 
conducted at about the same time. 
 
8.  It has been suggested earlier that development problems are quite 
complex. A successful attempt at combatting one development problem 
invariably introduces the emergence of another problem to tackle within 
the same vicinity. The effort of the project to provide an all-year round 
supply of livestock feed has meant a focus at woodland habitat 
regeneration, increasing the incidence of biting flies in general and tse-tse 
flies in particular. The same can be said of improved access to swamp 
lands which, although provides safe passage of cattle from uplands to 
drier swamp lands as well as improved access by women rice growers, 
also provides a fertile environment for the development of flies and an 
avenue for hyena to trap stray cattle particularly at night. 
 
9.  Project management By Remote Control. Success in rangeland protection 
and the dissemination of the grazing management technique was 
achieved quite easily around 1989. Since then, most of the project 
activities concentrated on the setting up of the Dairy Unit, constructing 
the Rest-House and maintaining project infrastructure including 
transferring management skills to the Local Management Committee.  
 
  In addition, it was also felt that the remaining project personnel in the 
form of the two UNV Agricultural Economist and Dairy Technologist 
should be used to provide institutional support to the Department of 
Livestock Services which had been observed to be weak in terms of 
skilled human resource capacity. This meant that project management 
had to go back on an earlier decision to base reluctant project personnel 




implication of this was that project supervision became ad hoc, and 
implemented from a distance of about 300 kilometres on occasional basis 
subject to availability of funding for official travel. 
 
  The necessary supervision which the project ought to have received in 
the construction of the Bansang Dam was therefore only partially 
implemented with difficulty, same as in the construction of the Rest-
House and its eventual management. What also became evident is that it 
is not possible to achieve a great deal of success managing a project by 
remote control. The institutional support aspect of the project also ought 
to have been separated from its rangeland management/income 
generation activities. As a matter of fact, addressing the institutional 
weakness of the Department of Livestock Services ought to be focused 
within the framework of a separate project. 
 
4. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
The basic motivation for keeping cattle goes beyond only economic 
considerations in The Gambia as a whole and is certainly the case in the 
McCarthy Island Division where the project GAM/86/006 was located. The 
consequence of this is that cattle numbers are excessive leading to overstocking 
which over stretches the grazing resources on existing rangelands with 
attendant environmental degradation and incidence of feed deficit. The 
conception and design of GAM/86/006 were informed by the perception that 
the most appropriate means of addressing this development problem is by the 
controlled management of scarce range resources for the benefit of the livestock 
owners in particular and the rural community in general. 
The project did not attempt to address the question of increasing cattle off-take 
and as a matter of fact, an augmentation in cattle numbers has been seen as one 
of the indices of its success. Addressing the issue of cattle off-take would have 
been a more appropriate means of commercialising the sub-sector and offer 
better income-generation possibilities for the economic development of the 
districts of Dankunku and Niamina West. This would have reduced grazing 
pressure on range resources and improved the carrying capacity of the land. 
 
However, simply reducing the stocking rate (i.e. by increasing the off-take) 
alone will not address completely the entire problem of environmental 
degradation more especially if the degradation has already occurred. The 
potential for success of an otherwise complex project might have been 
enhanced if other reform measures were also implemented including land 
reform and the creation of a land market, and having secure property rights for 





GAM/86/006 focused on controlled management of range resources and has 
demonstrated the advantages of improved grazing management. The approach 
of participatory involvement in project management by the eventual 
beneficiaries ensured that participants recognised the economic advantages of 
improved grazing management and are committed to protecting it. Hence there 
has been a reduction in the incidence of bush fires backed by an early warning 
system to spot places where accidental fires are starting. The result is the 
encouragement of new owners to go into cattle production, in-migration of 
animals from adjacent districts and improved health and nutrition of animals 
and the resident population. 
 
GAM/86/006 has been implemented in a highly integrated manner 
incorporating a number of flexible components with time even though some are 
not consistent with the original as well as the modified design of the project. 
The flexible implementation should however be seen as one of its strengths in 
that it answered to the felt needs of the target community and was not 
restrained by the usual rigidity characteristic of many project documents. In this 
vein, the supply of pipe borne water for human consumption of the project 
districts should be welcomed.  
 
The conception and introduction of the main income generation sub-
components were arbitrary and not motivated solely by economic 
considerations. The Dairy Unit is non-sustainable as an economic operation and 
as a matter of fact, it will be incorrect to describe a Unit processing less than 30 
litres of milk per day as a Plant. At best it could be described as a milk 
collection point. It has also been suggested that although the Rest-House 
appears to be sustainable, the level of operating profit is insufficient to assure 
long-term sustainability of other components of the project. The Rest-House 
management will also need to be improved. 
 
Overall, the activities of GAM/86/006 have been implemented with substantial 
Donor assistance. It is hence likely that this will have re-enforced the culture of 
Donor dependency rendering it very difficult to implement non-subsidised 




BENNETTE, J.W. (1984). Political ecology and development projects affecting 
pasturalist peoples in East Africa. Land Tenure Centre Research Paper No. 80. 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. 




DARKOH, M.B.K. (1996). The human cost dimension of desertification in the 
drylands of Africa. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 11(2):89-106. 
 
DAVIS, R.K. (1971). Some issues in the evolution, organisation and operation of 
group ranches. East African Journal of Rural Development, 4(1):22-33. 
 
DUCHATEL, A. (1989). Village milk processing in Dankunku. Report of a 
Consultancy prepared for Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Rome. 
 
FAO. 1993). Comments on the report of the joint evaluation mission of GAM/86/006. 
Rome, Italy. 
 
FLEMING, K. (1992), Marketing and management policy reforms and village level 
management interventions concerning livestock production in the Gambia. Report 
prepared for USAID's Agriculture and Natural Resources Programme. Banjul. 
 
KADZERE, C.T. (1996). Animal production level - a measure of social 
development. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 11(2):17-31. 
 
LAWRY, S.W. (1983). Land tenure, land politics and smallholder livestock 
development in Botswana. Land Tenure Centre Research Paper No. 78. University 
of Wisconsin-Madison. 
 
LAWRY, S.W. (1985). Land tenure issues in livestock development and range 
management. Land Tenure Centre Research Paper No. 125. University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. 
LYNE, M.C. & NIEUWOUDT, W.L. (1990). The real tragedy of the commons: 
livestock production in KwaZulu. The South African Journal of Economics. 
58(1):88-96. 
 
NKUNIKA, A.I.Z. (1987). The role of popular participation in programmes of 
social development. Journal of Social Development in Africa, 2(1):17-28. 
 
OXBY, C. (1981). Group Ranches in Africa. ODI Review, 2:45-56. 
 
RIDDELL, J.C. (1982). Land tenure issues in West African livestock and range 
development projects. Land tenure centre research paper No. 77. University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. 
 
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA. (1985). National Development Plan IV. Gaborone.  




RUNGE, C.F. (1981). Common property externalities: isolation, assurance and 
resource depletion in a traditional grazing context. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 63:595-606. 
 
SENESI, P. (1987). Baseline survey of Niamina Dankunku and Niamina west districts. 
Department of Livestock Services, Abuko. 
 
SENESI, P. (1990). Baseline survey of Fulladu West District. Department of 
livestock services. Abuko. 
 
THAPA, T.B. (1990). GAM/86/006-village milk processing unit TBK/2/90. Abuko 
 
THAPA, T.B. (1991). Management of Niamina Dairy Plant TBK/7/91. Abuko. 
 
THAPA, T.B. (1992). A manual on the design, operation and management of the 
Niamina dairy plant. TBK/1/92. Abuko 
 
THE GAMBIA. (1987). Project document of the government of the Gambia for 
GAM/86/006. Department of Livestock Services, Abuko. 
 
THE GAMBIA. (1989) Project performance and evaluation report of GAM/86/006. 
Department of Livestock Services, Abuko. 
 
THE GAMBIA. (1990). Project performance and evaluation report of GAM/86/006. 
Department of Livestock Services, Abuko. 
 
THE GAMBIA. (1992a). The 1991 livestock sector review. Department of Livestock 
Services, Abuko. 
 
THE GAMBIA. (1992b). Terminal report of GAM/86/006 - The Project For 
Rangeland and Water Development in the Niamina Dankunku and Niamina 
West Districts. Department of Livestock Services, Abuko. 
 
UNITED NATIONS. (1975). Popular Participation in Decision Making for 
development. New York, USA 
 
UNITED NATIONS. (1976). Community programmes for low income populations in 
Developing countries. New York, USA 
 
UNITED NATIONS. (1981). Popular Participation as a strategy for promoting 
community level action. New York, USA 




UNDP (1992a). Report of the joint UNDP/FAO/UNCDF/GOTG evaluation mission 
of GAM/86/006. The Rangeland and Water Development Project. 5-28 October 
1992. 
 
UNDP (1992b). Comments on the report of the joint evaluation mission of 
GAM/86/006. New York, USA. 
 
VINK, N. & KASSIER, W.E. (1987). The tragedy of the commons and livestock 
farming in Southern Africa. The South African Journal of Economics, 55:165-182. 